"One and Two, Once and Twice"
Richard S. Kayne
New York University
University of Cambridge
Nov. 6, 2013

1. Introduction.

Perlmutter's (1970) analysis of indefinite article a/an as a reduced form of numeral one was not immediately able, as he noted, to account for generic a/an or for phrases like:
(1) too long a book
which have no counterparts with numerals:
(2) *too long one book
(3) *too long two books

Barbiers (2005; 2007) argued that one is to be sharply distinguished from other numerals, in that one is indefinite and the others definite (in his sense of the term). In a way that was fairly close to Perlmutter, Barbiers took the numeral one to be a stressed, focussed version of the indefinite article.

In partial agreement with both of them, I will take there to be some relation between a/an and one, but I will suggest that there is no simple numeral one at all. One occurs in various syntactic contexts, only some of which involve what we would normally call numeral one. What we call numeral one will turn out to correspond to a combination of one and a silent element SINGLE (to be understood as a silent counterpart of single, using capital letters for silent elements).

The 'noun-replacing' one of:
(4) a blue one
is arguably the same one that appears as a subpart of numeral one, and does not replace a lexical noun; rather this one cooccurs with a silent noun. As I will suggest, this is so even in plural cases such as:
(5) two blue ones

In numeral examples like:
(6) They have just one car.

SINGLE is present:
(7) ...one SINGLE car
alongside one. In examples like (4) or (5), on the other hand, one is not accompanied by SINGLE.

## 2. Indefinite prenominal one

Perlmutter $(1970,235)$ noted a case in which even prenominal one seems not to be a numeral:
(8) That was a hell of a good paper.
(9) That was one hell of a good paper.

These two examples seem indistinguishable in interpretation (perhaps the second is a bit more emphatic), and the second does not seem to have the numeral interpretation that can be associated with one, as suggested, too, by there being no parallel example with true numerals:
(10) *Those were five hell of (a) good papers.

Another fairly straightforward instance of a prenominal non-numeral one is:
(11) There's one John Smithfield here to see you.
in the interpretation in which it seems almost identical to:
(12) There's a (certain) John Smithfield here to see you.

Somewhat different examples of prenominal non-numeral one can be found in temporal contexts such as:
(13) One day, he'll realize that we were right.
(14) At one time, you found chemistry interesting.
(15) They were once interested in syntax.
(In the last example, one is properly contained within once.)
The sentences with one in this section all have an interpretation close to that of sentences in which one would be replaced by a (certain) or by some. Let me therefore speak of all of these as involving instances of indefinite one.

## 3. The unity of one

Perhaps the most obvious case of non-numeral one is:
(16) The red cars are more expensive than the blue ones.

Taking this one to be a noun unrelated to either numeral one or to the instances of indefinite one given in the previous section, as Barbiers (2005) does, seems implausible. At the same time, it does seem clear that there is no numeral interpretation associated with the one of (16). What's left, then, is to understand the one of (16) as being the indefinite one of (9)-(15).

Why, though, would the indefinite one appear in both (16) and (9)-(15), which at first glance do not seem to have much in common, and why does indefinite one have the same form as what we call numeral one? The core answer to both these questions, I think, is that English has a single indefinite one (which will turn out to be itself bimorphemic) that finds a natural place in all the above environments, including that of numeral one, in a way that I will try to make clear.

Unifying these various instance of one in English is supported by their all sharing a restriction to singular count nouns (as opposed to mass nouns and to plurals). This restriction is obvious for numeral one:
(17) You've written only one paper(*s) this year.
(18) You seem to have only one *(piece of) knowledge at your fingertips.
but the restriction to singular count nouns is also found to one extent or another in the other cases mentioned, e.g.:
(19) We've spent one hell of a day on that job.
(20) *We've spent one hell of days/time on that job.

I return below to the apparent plural exception seen in:
(21) We prefer blue cars to red ones.
while noting that mass nouns respect the restriction even here:
(22) *We prefer brown sugar to white one.
(23) *The shallow water is safer than the deep one.
4. The indefinite article is distinct from one

The indefinite one of:
(24) That was one hell of a good paper.
(25) There's one John Smithfield here to see you.
(26) At one time, you found chemistry interesting.
mentioned in section 2 would appear to have a lot in common with the indefinite article a/an of:
(27) That was a hell of a good paper.
(28) There's a (certain) John Smithfield here to see you.
(29) At a certain time in the past, you found chemistry interesting.
so much so that it would initially seem natural to take indefinite one and indefinite a/an to be variants of the same element, as Perlmutter (1970) and Barbiers $(2005 ; 2007)$ did. (From a distributed morphology (DM) perspective, one might then (setting aside as phonology the question of a vs. an) take indefinite one and indefinite $a / a n$ to be two vocabulary items corresponding to a single morpheme.)

As Perlmutter noted, taking one and a/an to simply be variants of the same element leaves open the question why there exists a generic a/an that has no counterpart with one:
(30) A dog will always bark when happy
(31) One dog will always bark when happy.

The generic interpretation available in (30) is not available in (31). Nor does taking one and a/an to be variants of one another immediately account for:
(32) too long a/*one book

Nor for:
(33) They're selling one-drawer/*a-drawer desks in the back of the store.

Nor for:
(34) I have a sister and you have one/*a, too.

Nor for:
(35) We have a/*one few days left.

Understanding the contrasts in (30)-(35) may be compatible with the idea that one and a/an are variants of one another, but, if so, it clearly requires making more precise the notion of 'variant' that is at issue. Perlmutter (1970) himself made a proposal in the required direction, by taking a/an to be a reduced form of numeral one. An updating of Perlmutter's proposal that would take into account Cardinaletti and Starke (1999) might take a/an to be a clitic counterpart of non-clitic one, with a/an then being associated with less syntactic structure than one. (From a DM perspective this would mean that a/an and one do not in fact correspond to a single morpheme.)

## 5. One contains a classifier

Let me execute this idea that a/an is a reduced form of one in a different way, however, starting from (30)/(31), and in particular from the fact that the contrast between (30) and (31) recalls the fact that in Chinese, according to Cheng and Sybesma (1999,534), a singular classifier cannot occur within a generic DP introduced by yi ('a/an/one'). This leads to:
(36) One cannot occur in (31) (in the relevant reading) for the same reason that singular classifiers are excluded from Chinese generic DPs.
which in turn leads to:
(37) An English DP with one necessarily contains a singular classifier.
(Conversely, an English DP with a/an can (perhaps must) lack a classifier.) Assuming that the Chinese incompatibility between singular classifiers and generics reflects some universal such incompatibility, the impossibility of (31) (in the relevant reading) will now follow from (37).

That one is associated with a singular classifier and a/an not (necessarily) is close to Perlmutter's idea that $a / a n$ is a 'reduced form' of one, though its execution of the notion of 'reduction' in terms of the more specific notion of the presence vs. absence of a classifier has allowed an account of (30) vs. (31) that Perlmutter's less specific proposal was unable to achieve.

In Cardinaletti and Starke's (1999) terms, we would want in addition to relate the fact that one is associated with extra syntactic material (the singular classifier) to the fact that one is
morphophonologically 'bigger' than $a / a n$. We can do this as follows. One is ' $w-+$ an', where $w$ - is the classifier and an the indefinite article. What difference in vowel quality there is between one and an is arguably due to independent properties of English phonology, perhaps involving (in part) stress. The necessary prononciation of the $n$ of one even before a consonant, as opposed to the necessary dropping of the $n$ of an before a consonant, might again just be phonology. Or it might be related to the syntax, especially if the order 'classifier - indefinite article' ( $w-a n$; cf. Ghosh (2001, chap. 3 on some Tibeto-Burman having 'CLF Num N' order) is produced by leftward movement from a structure in which the indefinite article preceded the classifier. (Here there might be a link to the fact that English allows too long a book, etc.)

From this perspective, the contrasts mentioned earlier between one and a/an look as follows. The impossibility of (38) is arguably not specific to a/an, but is parallel to that of (39):
(38) I have a sister and you have a *(sister), too.
(39) Mary has done the assignments and John has done the *(assignments), too. That (38) becomes possible if the second $a$ is replaced by one, as in:
(40) I have a sister and you have one, too.
must now be due to a licensing property of the classifier $w$ - (that needs to be explored). The contrast in:
(41) We have a/*one few days left.
can be attributed to a clash between the classifier $w$ - and few (+ silent NUMBER), parallel to:
(42) We have a/*one small number of days left.
and to:
(43) Mary has written $a / * o n e ~ n u m b e r ~ o f ~ p a p e r s ~ t h i s ~ y e a r . ~$
in all of which it may be that number/NUMBER is not allowed to cooccur with a classifier.
As for:
(44) too long a/*one book
it looks like the classifier is incompatible with the preposing of the degree phrase (for reasons to be elucidated). Finally, the restriction seen in:
(45) They're selling one-drawer/*a-drawer desks in the back of the store.
may reflect the need in such examples for a numeral, which a/an is definitely not, from the perspective being pursued here.

## 6. The apparent plurality of ones

If indefinite one (in the entire range of examples under discussion) is akin to indefinite a/an except for the additional presence of the classifier morpheme $w$-, one might expect one to be limited to singular contexts, as a/an is:
(46) We bought a car(*s).

Yet English allows:
(47) We bought blue ones.

On the other hand, one is not always compatible with plurals:
(48) We bought exactly one book(*s).
(49) One day(*s) you'll see that we were right.

However, as with inflectional morphology in general, the very fact of saying that ones is plural in examples such as (47) may be misleading. What does go without saying is that in sentences containing ones, one is followed by plural -s. Saying beyond that that ones is plural normally goes with the (usually implicit) assumption that one and plural -s form a constituent. But that assumption is not straightforward.

In particular, we know that English adjectives quite generally are incompatible with a following plural -s:
(50) The other(*s) cars are red.
(51) They have two four-year old(*s) children.

Yet the following are perfectly possible:
(52) The others are red.
(53) They have two four-year olds.
which led me in earlier work (Kayne 2003) to propose that sentences like (52) and (53) contain a silent noun that is the true licenser of plural $-s$ :
(54) the other N -s
(55) two four-year old N -s
with $N$ in (53) (but not (52)) necessarily human (or higher animal - cf. in part someone). Somewhat similarly, the particular interpretation of:
(56) They're serving three different wines today.
can be analyzed in terms of:
(57) ...three different wine-KIND-s
with a silent noun corresponding to kind and with -s pluralizing KIND rather than wine itself (thereby eliminating the need for 'shifting' wine itself from mass to count).

The fact that plural $-s$ in (52), (53) and (56) pluralizes a noun that is not visible suggests a way of understanding sentences like (47) with apparently plural ones that makes sense of the cooccurrence of $-s$ with the indefinite singular one. The idea is that the $-s$ of blue ones, for example, is associated with a noun that is silent and that is moreover distinct from the noun that singular one is directly associated with. That is, all instances of 'plural' ones must involve two silent nouns:
(58) blue one $\mathrm{N} \mathrm{N} \mathrm{-s}$
with the first N singular and the second N plural. (This allows taking one, like $a / a n$, to be limited to immediately singular contexts.)

What then would be the exact content of these two nouns in the last DP of a sentence like the following?:
(59) Susan writes short books and Mary writes long ones.

Thinking of (56)/(57) and of Heim (1987), van Riemsdijk (2005) and Leu (2008a), what comes to mind is:
(60) long [one KIND] [BOOK -s]
in which one goes with silent KIND and $-s$ with silent BOOK, without there being any conflict between the singularity of indefinite one and the plurality of $-s$.

## 7. DPs with two indefinite articles

If the indefinite one of examples like:
(61) They would like to buy a blue one.
is akin, apart from the extra $w$ - morpheme, to indefinite a/an, then examples like (61) in effect contain two indefinite articles. Having two indefinite articles in what looks like a simple DP is, however, something that is fairly common in the Germanic languages (cf. Leu (2008b) and references cited there) in a very visible way. A dialect example in English of the sort given by Wood (2002) is:
(62) a such a wonderful book
and in my English, the following is possible:
(63) We'll be there in a half an hour.

So there is clearly no general bar against taking the one of (61) to contain an indefinite article, though it remains to be understood why standard English rejects (62), as well as why perhaps all English rejects:
(64) *They would like to buy a blue a book.

The generalization seems to be that standard English allows two overt indefinite articles (again, taking one to contain $a / a n$ ) in cases such as (61) only if the lexical noun is silent. Possibly the movement of blue in (61) to the left of indefinite one is an instance of pied-piping dependent on the movement of that silent noun. (Barbiers (2005 172) has the idea that DP moves, triggered by focus, to spec of one in Northern Brabantish, in a partially similar way.)

As is well-known, the one of (61) is incompatible with certain noun-'complements', e.g.:
(65) The best friend of my sister is taller than the best friend/*one of my brother.
(66) A large number of syntacticians were talking with a large number/*one of phonologists. This is perfectly compatible with the present perspective, within which this restriction is to be seen as one concerning what can be 'stranded' in the context of a silent noun.

## 8. Ones and a one

Returning to ones, we can note that bare ones is impossible:
(67) *Mary knows linguists and Susan knows ones, too.

In my English, ones is fully acceptable only with a prenominal adjective:
(68) Mary knows interesting linguists but Susan knows only dull ones.
(69) ??Mary knows linguists that are interesting but Susan knows only ones that are dull.

In addition, in relative clause examples like (69), I find that contrast/focus is required, insofar as the following is pretty much unacceptable:
(70) *Mary knows linguists that are interesting and Susan knows ones that are interesting, too. Contrast/focus seems to be relevant to prenominal adjectives, too, given (cf. Halliday and Hasan $(1976,95))$ :
(71) People who read interesting books generally profit considerably from the reading of those interesting books/*ones.

At first glance it appears that (67) contrasts minimally with:
(72) Mary knows a linguist and Susan knows one, too.
but it may be that a closer match in the singular to (67) is the following (with only an overt indefinite article preceding one), which shares the unacceptability of (67):
(73) *Mary knows a linguist and Susan knows a one, too.
as well as sharing with (67) sensitivity to prenominal adjectives:
(74) Mary knows a smart linguist and Susan knows a smart one, too.
(75) *Mary knows a smart linguist and Susan knows a one that's smart, too.
(true for me, though Halliday and Hasan (1976, 96, 102) accept some such examples) and sensitivity to contrast/focus:
(76) People who read an interesting book generally profit considerably from the reading of that interesting book/*one.

The preceding facts suggest that (74) is to be analyzed in a way parallel to (60), repeated here:
(77) long [one KIND] [BOOK -s]
i.e. (74) contains as a subpart:
(78) a smart [one KIND] LINGUIST
where the $a$ of (74) is keyed to the singularity of LINGUIST (with a point of similarity to that kind of linguist vs. those kind of linguists). (Why 'one KIND' is not comparably available with mass nouns *brown sugar and white one - remains an open question; perhaps KIND could be replaced by an additional silent counterpart of the lexical noun/antecedent.)

The requirement for a contrastive/focussed prenominal adjective in (74) (and to a partial extent in (68)) can now be understood (as a first approximation) as a requirement concerning the need for 'one KIND' in these to be preceded by that kind of modifier, perhaps akin to the restriction seen in:
(79) Mary only appreciates linguists of the *(intelligent) kind.
(80) She only appreciates *(those) kind of linguists.

If this is on the right track, it suggests further that the adjective in (74) and (68) should be taken to be a modifier of KIND rather than of the lexical noun (much as Kayne (2005, chap.8) took red in a red car to be a modifier of COLOR, rather than of car, the implications for Cinque (2010) need to be explored).

## 9. Restrictions on ones

The licensing effect of a prenominal adjective seen with ones in (68) is not found (at least not for most speakers, it seems - cf. Halliday and Hasan (1976, 97)) with prenominal numerals, even if they are contrastive/focussed:
(81) Mary has three brothers but Susan has four *(ones).

In addition, in my English, a numeral actually degrades the acceptability of ones with a postnominal modifier:
(82) ?I don't have any pictures of you, but I do have ones of your children.
(83) I don't have four pictures of you, but I do (happen to) have five *(ones) of your children.

If the numeral is followed by an adjective, acceptability returns:
(84) Mary knows a lot of linguists but she knows only three intelligent ones.
(85) (?)She bought four syntax books yesterday and three other ones today.
whereas if the adjective precedes the numeral, the sentence remains unacceptable:
(86) Mary spent a beautiful three weeks in Italy and an even more beautiful four weeks/*ones in Spain.
(87) *She bought four syntax books yesterday and another four ones today.

This suggests a restriction (for most speakers) to the effect that in '[one KIND] [NOUN -s]', 'one KIND' cannot be directly modified by a numeral (for reasons to be elucidated).

There is another restriction on one(s) that seems less widespread than with numerals. It concerns prenominal possessors, and holds sharply in my English:
(88) I didn't like his paper, but I did like yours.
(89) *I didn't like his paper, but I did like your one/ones.

As with numerals, a prenominal adjective lifts the restriction:
(90) I did like your recent one/ones.

Why this restriction holds and why it holds only for some speakers remains to be understood.
(Relevant is (for me) ?I have ones of you vs. *? have his ones of you.)
An apparently comparable restriction for demonstratives holds for even fewer speakers. The following is possible for many speakers, though impossible for me (how best to express the intraEngish variation seen in this section is left an open question):
(91) *I prefer those ones.

In my English, this restriction holds for ones but not for one:
(92) I prefer that one.

On the assumption that that one/this one will be acceptable to all, a link suggests itself to:
(93) I have one, too.
which contrasts with both */ have ones and with *I have a one.
Setting temporarily aside the question of the numeral reading of one, let us say that the one of (93) and (92) corresponds to the initial one of:
(94) I have one blue one.

This initial one clearly has no requirement that something (contrastive or focussed) precede it, as
opposed to the second one of (94) (which is associated with KIND, as in (78)):
(95) *I have one one.

The idea that one is possible in (93) and (92) for the same reason that initial one is in (94) (because no relevant restriction holds of such instances of one) leads to the conclusion that the one of:
(96) *I have ones
(97) *I have a one
cannot correspond to the initial one of (94).
If what l'm calling initial one must be strictly initial within DP (apart from that/this, and perhaps apart from elements like only, even), then the one of (97) is clearly not an instance of initial one, as desired.
As for the one of (96), it can hardly correspond to initial one, given:
(98) *I have one blue cars.
(99) *I have one blue ones.

As seen in these two examples, initial one is not compatible with plural.
Left undiscussed so far is the impossibility of:
(100) *I have a/one blue one car.
which is perhaps to be assimilated to that of (64) above.

## 10. Numeral one

As noted earlier, there are various clear instances of initial one that don't feel like instances of numeral one, e.g.:
(101) That was one hell of a paper.
(102) There's one John Smithfield here to see you.
(103) One day you'll see that we were right.

In (101) and (103), one cannot be contrastively stressed in the way that numeral one can be. In addition, numerals higher than one are impossible:
(104) *Those were two hell of a papers/hells of papers.
(105) *Two days you'll see that we were right.

In (102), on the other hand, one can be contrastively stressed, but that reflects the fact that (102) is perceived to be ambiguous between a true numeral reading and a reading close to that of a certain.

The question is how best to distinguish numeral one from initial non-numeral one. It doesn't seem that stress is sufficient since (to my ear at least) the initial non-numeral one in each of (101)-(103) is not unstressed. Let me suggest, then, a solution that has a syntactic aspect to it, namely that what we call numeral one amounts to initial (indefinite) one plus a silent counterpart of single. For example in:
(106) There's only one John Smithfield here to see you today.
with numeral one, we have:
(107) ...one SINGLE John Smithfield...
(Possibly non-numeral initial one is also accompanied by a silent element, though a distinct one, e.g. CERTAIN.)

The proposal in (107) may lead to an account of a contrast similar to one noted by Perlmutter (1970, 234):
(108) the only two/three/four books that you've ever read
(109) *the only one book that you've ever read
in terms of the contrast seen in:
(110) That's actually the (*only) (one) single book we've been meaning to read
(Note that, as seen here, numeral one can cooccur with overt single, too.)

## 11. Ordinals

The idea that numeral one is to be understood as indefinite one accompanied by silent SINGLE is in partial agreement with Barbiers's (2005; 2007) claim that one is very different from two and numerals higher than two (setting aside composites like 21, 31, etc.). He took numeral one to be a stressed, focussed version of the indefinite article. The present proposal doesn't rely directly on the notion of 'focus', using instead the presence of SINGLE.

Barbiers emphasized the relative systematicity of the cross-linguistic absence of a regularly formed ordinal based on one:
(111) Mary was the first/*oneth linguist to have proposed that.

From the present perspective, this must reflect the inability of ordinal -th to combine either with indefinite one by itself or with SINGLE (or single):
(112) *the (a/one) single-th linguist

Presumably, the numerals from two on up (apart again from complex numerals having 1 as a subpart) do not (necessarily) involve SINGLE. (Why ordinal -th differs from the -ce of once needs to be elucidated.)
12. Two and coordination

The proposal in (107) contains the claim that what we think of as numeral one is not a syntactic or semantic primitive. (Nor is indefinite one, if it is bimorphemic, as suggested earlier.) This type of proposal might now be extended to numeral two (with different details), as follows. In some varieties of English, both is extremely close to two:
(113) the two of us; the both of us
(114) the two books; the both books

The point of bringing in both is that both also occurs with coordination:
(115) both this book and that book
leading to the possibility that two might occur in parallel fashion, but with coordinated indefinites, as in:
(116) *two book and book
which is ill-formed, but perhaps becomes well-formed if part of the coordinate structure is silent:
(117) two book AND BOOK
(or perhaps 'two BOOK AND book'; in addition, classifiers will need to be taken into account).
(117) gives the impression that English should allow two book rather than two books. In fact,

English allows both types:
(118) This file cabinet has two drawers.
(119) This is a two-drawer file cabinet.

In addition some speakers (myself not included) allow:
(120) You owe us five pound.

Since (117) provides us directly with (119) and (120), the question now is how to allow for (118). A perhaps relevant fact is that overt coordination as in (115) does not permit plural -s:
(121) *both this book and that book-s
(and similarly if both is omitted) This might suggest taking plural $-s$ to be a coordinating element like and, except that plural -s would require the following conjunct, as in (117), to be silent (left open is how
best to extend this to instances of plural $-s$ in the absence of any numeral, as well as the question how best to distinguish English from Hungarian, not to mention DP-internal number agreement.):
(122) two book s BOOK

## 13. Three and higher

The preceding amounts to saying that two is not a syntactic or semantic numeral primitive, but is rather essentially the notion of minimal coordination (cf. verb agreement in Hungarian). In this spirit, three book (as in a three-book series) might be analyzed as (cf. Pica (2011), using other rather than and):
(123) three [book AND TWO [BOOK AND BOOK]]

Four book could then be:
(124) four [book AND THREE [BOOK AND TWO [BOOK AND BOOK]]]

Whereas five book(s) (and higher) might rather be as in:
(125) five [book AND MANY BOOK]

Possibly some languages treat four as in (125), i.e. like five, rather than like three.
From the preceding perspective, two, three and four (if four is not akin to five) are quasiuninterpretable in something like Chomsky's sense, insofar as the value of the numeral interpretation is given by the number of instances of the noun. Whereas five (or four) and higher would be interpretable.

We can note, also, that three is more complex than two, in the specific sense that (123) contains a silent numeral while (117) and (122) do not. This may be at least part of the reason for certain asymmetries in English between two and three. For example:
(126) both books; *throth books
i.e. there is no 'trial' counterpart to both. Similarly:
(127) half the books; *third the books

In addition, in contemporary English, we have:
(128) I've been there only twice/*thrice.
(though thrice is still marginally acceptable in ?a thrice-discussed question; what the change in English concerning thrice might correlate with is not clear).

## 14. Once and twice

If the difference between twice and thrice does correlate with other differences between two and three, that gives us good reason to take twice (and thrice) to contain two (and three), in a sense that I will now try to make more precise. We can begin by taking twice to be 'tw + ice' (and thrice to be 'thr + ice'), with $t w$ - the numeral morpheme transparently also found in twelve, twenty, twin and two (with the non-pronunciation of the $/ \mathrm{w} /$ of two phonologically regular, in all probability). Let us assume further than -ice is a single morpheme that is also contained in once. This -ice morpheme might have the interpretation of 'time'. Alternatively, and more likely I suspect, $t w$ - and -ice cooccur with a silent noun TIME:
(129) tw- -ice TIME (or perhaps 'tw- TIME -ice')

If so, then the status of -ice will ultimately need to be determined (it might be related to the genitive/possessive 's despite the lack of voicing). From this perspective, once would then be:
(130) one -ice TIME (or 'one TIME -ice'; this perhaps supported by one other time vs. *once other)

That English (and similarly for many if not all other languages) allows a silent TIME is suggested by:
(131) We should leave soon.
(132) ?We should leave at the soonest time possible.
with soon cooccurring with silent TIME in (131). (We can also note that (129) and (130) facilitate the work of the interpretive component.)

The presence of TIME in (130) is straightforwardly compatible with the possibility of a demonstrative, or to a more delicate extent of a definite article:
(133) Do it just this/the once.

In my English, this is not possible with twice (why some English seems to allow it at least with the remains to be understood):
(134) *Do it just this/the twice.
(135) If you had helped us just that once/*twice,...

Surprisingly, a plural demonstrative is for me even worse:
(136) **Do it just these twice.
(137) **If you had helped us just those twice,...

This suggests not only that it is singular silent TIME that is present in (129), as indicated there, but in addition that plural silent TIMES is not available at all with twice. (Cf. the proposal in Kayne (2003) to the effect that in at the age of seventy, there is a silent YEAR rather than a silent YEARS.)

That twice is accompanied by TIME and not by TIMES is also suggested by:
(138) ?John has been there two times, but we've been there only one.
vs.
(139) *John has been there twice, but we've been there only one. insofar as this contrast recalls:
(140) ??Mary has won that race two times, but John has won it only one.
(141) Two-time winners of that race have by definition already won it one *(time).
(Cf. J has been collecting twenty-year old cars for the past six *(years) (if no other antecedent is present)). Also ?Two times are enough vs. *Twice are enough.) Possibly, the fact that twice goes with TIME and not with TIMES is related to the contrast between (141) and the following:
(142) *Two-times winners of that race...

Cf. perhaps the general property of English that prohibits non-demonstrative prenominal modifiers from being immediately followed by plural $-s$ (for reasons that remain to be understood):
(143) Frequent(*s) winners...

Note that no claim is being made that silent elements can never be plural. A plural silent noun seems appropriate in:
(144) Those three books are more interesting than these two. and even:
(145) ?Those three times we were there were more interesting than these (other/more recent) two. which contrasts sharply with *these twice, *those twice.

The widespread occurrence and the non-negligeable degree of articulation of silent elements of this sort is further suggested by the absence, alongside:
(146) John will two-time her for sure.
of:
(147) *John will twice her for sure.
the reason being that two-time in (146) does not have two modifying time; rather there must be at least as much structure as in two at a time, with two modifying a silent noun (akin to WOMAN/WOMEN) distinct from time. The possibility of silent plural WOMEN is not incompatible with the preceding discussion if we interpret the impossibility of (142) as keyed to the plural morpheme $-s$, rather than to the notion of plural in general. That such a distinction is appropriate is suggested (in my English) by:
(148) Four-children/*four-kids families are not as common as they used to be.
(149) Mice-catching/*rats-catching cats are becoming harder to find.
(150) Hair(*s)-pulling is to be discouraged.

Returning to once, we can note that attributing to it a subcomponent one is supported by the fact that once shows the same numeral vs. non-numeral ambiguity (interpreted earlier as presence vs. absence of SINGLE) as one. The numeral interpretation is found in:
(151) We've been there only once.
the non-numeral interpretation in (the normal interpretation of):
(152) You were once even happier together.
(153) We were young once.

## 15 Conclusion

There is no single morpheme corresponding to what we think of as numeral one (and similarly for non-numeral indefinite one). One is built upon the combination of a classifier and the indefinite article; numeral one in addition is accompanied by SINGLE. Nor is numeral two as 'simple' as it looks, and similarly for other numerals, all of which (apart from one) involve syntactic coordination.

Once and twice contain one and two, respectively. Both are associated with silent TIME, which in these cases must be singular, and cannot be plural. Silent elements often have intricate properties that cannot possibly be learned from the primary data without substantial help from built-in aspects of the language faculty.

References:
Barbiers, S. (2005) "Variation in the Morphosyntax of One," Journal of Comparative Germanic Linguistics, 8, 159-183.
Barbiers, S. (2007) "Indefinite Numerals One and Many and the Cause of Ordinal Suppletion," Lingua.
Cardinaletti, A. and M. Starke (1999) "The Typology of Structural Deficiency: A Case Study of the Three Classes of Pronouns," in H. van Riemsdijk (ed.) Clitics in the Languages of Europe, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 145-233.
Cheng, L.L.-S. and R. Sybesma (1999) "Bare and Not-So-Bare Nouns and the Structure of NP," Linguistic Inquiry, 30, 509-542.
Cinque, G. (2010) The Syntax of Adjectives. A Comparative Study, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Ghosh, R. (2001) Some Aspects of Determiner Phrase in Bangla and Asamiya, Doctoral dissertation, Tezpur University, Assam.
Halliday, M.A.K. and R. Hasan (1976) Cohesion in English, Longman, London.
Heim, I. (1987) "Where Does the Definiteness Restriction Apply? Evidence from the Definiteness of Variables," in E.J. Reuland and A.G.B. ter Meulen (eds.) The Representation of (In)definiteness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 21-42.
Kayne, R.S. (2003) "Silent Years, Silent Hours", in L.-O. Delsing et al. (eds.) Grammar in Focus. Festschrift for Christer Platzack. Volume 2, Wallin and Dalholm, Lund, 209-226 (reprinted in Kayne (2005)).

Kayne, R.S. (2005) Movement and Silence, Oxford University Press, New York.
Kayne, R.S. (2010) Comparisons and Contrasts, Oxford University Press, New York.
Leu, T. (2008a) "What for Internally," Syntax, 11, 1-25.
Leu, T. (2008b) The Internal Syntax of Determiners, Doctoral dissertation, New York University.
Perlmutter, D.M. (1970) "On the Article in English," in M. Bierwisch and K.E. Heidolph (eds.) Progress in Linguistics, Mouton, The Hague, 233-248.
Pica, P. (2011) "From Object-tracking Representation to Numbers: An Universal Base for Counting," poster presentation, 50 Years of Linguistics at MIT.
Riemsdijk, H. van (2005) "Silent nouns and the spurious indefinite article in Dutch," in M. Vulchanova and T. Åfarli, Grammar \& Beyond: Essays in honour of Lars Hellan, 163-178, Novus Press, Oslo.
Wood, J.L. (2002) "Much about Such," Studia Linguistica, 56, 91-115.

